

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01013 01 OF 02 241314Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13  
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 DOEE-00  
SSO-00 NRC-05 /152 W  
-----118057 241335Z /42

P 241302Z JAN 78  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5032  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 01013

CW MESSAGE NO. 9

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM UR US UK  
SUBJECT: US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND  
SEVEN: CONSULTATIONS WITH UK

1. AS STIPULATED IN THE ROUND SEVEN GUIDANCE PAPER,  
THE CW DEL HAS CONSULTED WITH UK REPRESENTATIVES  
CONCERNING IRRITANTS AND DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES.  
THIS MESSAGE REPORTS THE RESULTS OF THE CONSULTATIONS.

2. ON JANUARY 11, US DELOFFS PROVIDED UK MISOFF WITH  
COPY OF GUIDANCE ON IRRITANTS, OUTLINED US VIEWS ON  
DISPOSITION OF DECLARED FACILITIES, AND INDICATED THAT  
WE WISHED TO KNOW UK REACTION TO THESE POSITIONS.

3. ON JANUARY 19 UK MISOFF PROVIDED PAPER CONTAINING  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01013 01 OF 02 241314Z

LONDON REACTION (TEXT CONTAINED PARA 4 BELOW). SUB-  
SEQUENTLY US DELOFFS MET WITH UK MISOFF TO OBTAIN  
CLARIFICATION OF SEVERAL POINTS. US DEL OBSERVATIONS  
CONTAINED PARA 5 BELOW.

4. BEGIN TEXT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS - WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR  
HAVING BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF THE US NEGOTIATING POSI-

TION AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO MAKE.

PAST AND PRESENT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES

WE AGREE THAT COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF PRESENT CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES, AND PAST FACILITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN MOTHBALLED, IS DESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS REGARDING PAST FACILITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO OTHER USES BY COMMERCIAL CONCERNS.

IRRITANTS AND INCAPACITANTS

WE SUPPORT THE US VIEW THAT A POSSIBLE COMBAT REQUIREMENT FOR IRRITANTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED.

WE GENERALLY SUPPORT THE US LINE THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO DEAL IN THE SAME WAY WITH THE WIDE RANGE OF DIFFERENT CHEMICALS THAT COME INTO THE CATEGORY OF IRRITANTS. WE TAKE THE VIEW THAT EXCLUSION FROM THE CONVENTION SHOULD BE BASED PRINCIPALLY ON A LETHAL TOXICITY CRITERION. OUR OVERRIDING CONCERN IS THAT ANY TOXICITY THRESHOLD MUST BE SUCH THAT THE CONVENTION WOULD NOT INCLUDE AGENTS SUCH AS CS WHICH WE REQUIRE FOR RIOT CONTROL PURPOSES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CLARIFICATION ON WHY THE US WISHES THE AGENT CN, WHICH HAS A RELATIVELY HIGH TOXICITY, TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 01013 01 OF 02 241314Z

CONVENTION.

WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE "GRANDFATHER CLAUSE" MIGHT BE TOO SUBJECTIVE. IT OVERLAPS WITH THE CRITERIA IN 2(D).

WE SHOULD LIKE THE CRITERIA IN 2(B) TO BE DELETED SINCE FUTURE ANTI-TERRORIST AGENTS MIGHT NOT WORK BY SENSORY IRRITATION.

WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO DELETE 2(C) AND TO INSERT A CLAUSE ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

"THE PRINCIPAL EFFECT SHOULD BE SHORT TERM I.E. COMPLETE FUNCTIONING SHOULD BE RESTORED IN 24 HOURS BUT PARTIAL RECOVERY WOULD NORMALLY OCCUR IN A MUCH SHORTER TIME".

WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE WORDING FOR 2(D):

"THE CHEMICAL HAS, OR IS INTENDED TO HAVE, AND IS IN QUANTITIES SUITABLE ONLY FOR, APPLICATION DOMESTICALLY FOR RIOT CONTROL OR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES". END TEXT.

5. UK DELOFF INDICATED THAT DURING WORLD WAR II  
IMPERIALCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (ICI) HAD SIX PLANTS  
ENGAGED IN MAKING CW AGENTS. FOUR OF THESE PLANTS  
STILL EXIST AND ARE USED FOR CIVILIAN CHEMICAL PRODUCTION.  
APPARENTLY THE PLANTS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVELY MODIFIED.  
IN ADDITION, A BUILDING WHICH HOUSED A WORLD WAR II CW  
AGENT PLANT IS NOW IN USE BY BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS FOR  
PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH THE CIVIL NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM.  
UK DELOFF UNDERTOOK TO OBTAIN MORE DETAILED INFORMATION,  
INCLUDING IDENTITY OF AGENTS PRODUCED IN THESE FACILITIES.

6. COMMENTS: A. UNTIL FURTHER DETAILS ARE OBTAINED  
ON THE BRITISH FACILITIES INVOLVED WE WILL BE UNABLE TO  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GENEVA 01013 01 OF 02 241314Z

JUDGE THE FULL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UK OF THE US  
POSITION ON DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 01013 02 OF 02 241316Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 EA-10 EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 IO-13  
L-03 NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02  
PA-01 PRS-01 DOE-11 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 DOEE-00  
SSO-00 NRC-05 /152 W

-----118063 241335Z /42

P 241302Z JAN 78

FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5033  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 01013

CW MESSAGE NO. 9

B. WE CLARIFIED FOR UK MISOFF REASONS US WISHES TO  
EXCLUDE AGENT CN. BRITISH CLEARLY HAVE NO INTEREST IN  
PROTECTING THIS AGENT.

C. BRITISH ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY SENSITIVE ABOUT THE CONVENTION PLACING RESTRICTIONS ON FUTURE ANTI-TERRORIST INCAPACITANT AGENTS BEING DEVELOPED POSSIBLY WITH NORTHERN IRELAND IN MIND. THIS IS WHY THEY HAVE SUGGESTED DELETING CRITERION (B) (LOCALIZED EFFECTS) AND REVISING CRITERION (C) (SHORT DURATION OF EFFECTS).

D. UK MISOFF ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE WORDING FOR CRITERION (D) (RIOT CONTROL USE), IN WHICH QUANTITIES WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE SUITABLE ONLY FOR DOMESTIC USE, WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH STATEMENT AT BEGINNING OF PAPER THAT "A POSSIBLE COMBAT REQUIREMENT FOR IRRITANTS SHOULD BE PROTECTED."

E. AT THIS STAGE WE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND CHANGING US POSITION ON DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES OR ACCEPTING UK CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 01013 02 OF 02 241316Z

SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISING THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CRITERIA (B), (C) AND (D). RATHER WE PLAN TO CONTINUE CONSULTATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO FIND OUT MORE PRECISELY WHAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT AND WHETHER THE CONCERNS APPEAR TO BE JUSTIFIED. VANDEN HEUVEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NEGOTIATIONS, CHEMICAL WARFARE WEAPONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 jan 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978GENEVA01013  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780035-0536  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** GENEVA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780130/aaaaazhd.tel  
**Line Count:** 198  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 07ed24e1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3726776  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US-USSR CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, ROUND SEVEN: CONSULTATIONS WITH UK  
**TAGS:** PARM, UR, US, UK  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/07ed24e1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014